Opertus

Keys and notes

Learn how Opertus separates viewing from spending and represents private ownership with notes.

Opertus represents private ownership with encrypted notes rather than public accounts. A note can be discovered with one key but spent only with another.

Independent key capabilities

A recovery phrase derives two hardened branches:

  • the view branch is a secp256k1 key used to decrypt notes and derive the nullifier key;
  • the spend branch is reduced to a BabyJubJub scalar used to derive one-time note secrets.

The view key cannot be converted into the spend key. A watch-only wallet can read note values and detect when its notes are spent, but it cannot satisfy the circuit's ownership check. Conversely, a spend key alone does not reveal which encrypted notes belong to it.

Exported key strings may remain in application memory even after a key manager is wiped. Treat the recovery phrase, viewing key, spend key, and decrypted note store according to the capability each exposes.

Meta-address

An Opertus meta-address is a custom Base58Check string beginning with opertus. Its decoded payload has this order:

PositionSegmentPurpose
1Version and schemeIdentifies the Opertus address format
2Nullifier image NPublishes Poseidon(nk) without revealing the private nullifier key
3Packed spend pointLets senders derive a one-time BabyJubJub owner key
4Compressed view pointLets senders derive the note-encryption key
5ChecksumDetects malformed or mistyped encodings

Malformed lengths, versions, checksums, and curve points are rejected.

Meta-address boundary

A meta-address contains no chain ID and no private key. The same meta-address can receive on multiple networks, but each note ciphertext is authenticated to one chain and one pool.

Note opening

A note commitment binds five field values:

FieldEncodingConstraint or role
tokenToken address as an integerNative ETH uses token ID 0
valueAtomic token unitsMust be less than 2^120
ownerPubKeyField elementHash of the one-time BabyJubJub owner point
randomnessField elementFresh per note so otherwise identical payments differ
blindField elementPoseidon(N, blinding) using fresh private blinding

Its onchain commitment is:

blind      = Poseidon(N, blinding)
commitment = Poseidon(token, value, ownerPubKey, randomness, blind)

A commitment is not ciphertext. It is a hiding fingerprint inserted into the Merkle tree. The separately encrypted payload lets the recipient recover the opening and verifies that the plaintext matches the chain commitment.

One-time ownership

The sender combines the recipient's public spend point with fresh ephemeral data to create a one-time public owner key. The sender can construct that key but cannot derive its secret. After decrypting the note, the recipient combines the spend key with the sender's spend ephemeral to derive the one-time secret.

The circuit checks that the secret opens the note's owner public key. This is the authority to spend; knowing the ciphertext, commitment, meta-address, or view key does not substitute for it.

Nullifiers and watch-only state

The view key derives a private nullifier key nk. Spending publishes:

nullifier = Poseidon(nk, commitment)

The pool stores each nullifier permanently and rejects a second use. An observer sees that a nullifier was spent but cannot link it to a commitment without note knowledge. A viewing wallet can compute the link and update its balance without holding the spend key.

N is public

N = Poseidon(nk) is public in the meta-address. N is not nk, is not the nullifier, and is not a deposit or public proof input. The sender uses N only to form the blinded note field.

Encryption and scanning

Each send uses new view and spend ephemerals. A sending wallet derives them from its outgoing key, the nonce and the recipient, so it can rebuild every note it sent from the seed; a deposit with no sending wallet draws them at random. A two-byte view tag quickly filters most foreign payloads before authenticated decryption.

View tags speed up scanning

The two-byte tag lets a scanner skip most foreign notes without decrypting them. About one in 65,536 foreign notes matches by chance, so authenticated decryption, not the tag, decides whether a note belongs to the recipient.

The ciphertext is authenticated to the chain, pool, ephemerals, tag, and commitment. A payload moved to another domain, paired with another commitment, or modified in transit is rejected. Scanning recovers note data and the nullifier capability, but intentionally leaves the one-time spend secret unset.

Each note's encryption key opens that note only. Either side can share it as a receipt to disclose one payment without the view key. See selective disclosure.

Zero-value and return notes

Zero-value notes are real notes

Every private spend produces three real output notes. An output carrying no payment or fee is still a fresh zero-value note with a distinct commitment. Reusing opening data duplicates a commitment. The pool accepts the copy, but both share one nullifier, so only one can be spent.

Return notes follow the same commitment formula. Their values are measured by the pool and published in ReturnShielded, while their encrypted ownership data remains scannable by the recipient.

See proofs and settlement for how these fields are constrained, and troubleshooting for scanning and commitment failures.

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